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Capital markets are said to be efficient if they fully and correctly reflect all 
relevant information in its prices (Fama, 1970). Based on this idea, the only 
determinant of a security`s price is their fundamental value, calculated as the present 
value of discounted expected future cash flows.  Because prices already reflect all 
public information, it is not possible to make abnormal economic profits by analysing 
the balance sheets, income statements or announcements of dividend changes 
(Malkiel et al., 1991). The only determinant of expected profit of holding a security is 
the risk associated with it.  
Throughout time, theorists and especially practitioners have challenged this 
efficient market hypothesis, which found evidence that investors are indeed able to 
earn excess risk-adjusted rates of return by the help of analysing predictable patterns 
(Malkiel 2003). One of the first market anomalies challenging the efficiency of 
financial markets were found by Philip Brown and Ray Bale in 1968, who observed 
that market prices react sharply to earnings announcements when new information 
becomes available, and then continue drifting in the same direction for various 
months.  
Because these systematic pricing errors are usually not explainable by market 
frictions, financial research focuses on the psychological and behavioural elements of 
stock price determination. In this sense, focus is put on the context in which 
economic agents make their decisions, and the influence of human feelings such as 
greed, excitement, anxiety and panic in this decision making process. We will 
therefore integrate individual and cognitive processes and their particular constraints 
into economic theory both on individual, and collective level. Because humans show 
patterns in their behaviour, certain market reactions to putatively irrational human 
behaviour actually become explainable by the help of “emotional finance”.  
Human irrationality is only able to influence market prices if the masses as a 
whole adapt to certain feelings, emotions or beliefs. Throughout this research we will 
see that humans actually tend to converge in their belief and perceptions of reality, 
leading to masses as a whole taking on a certain position. As seen in various 
examples of bubbles in stock markets throughout history, this generalized belief of 
	  
	  
the masses about what is perceived to be true can have drastic impact on valuations 
and therefore prices of securities.  
In analysing which forces lead masses to take on a certain position, we 
analyse the effects that the media has in influencing the perceptions of investors. The 
power of the media in influencing these perceptions may not be underestimated, as 
even sophisticated analysts draw their conclusions on irrelevant aspects of how 
financial information is presented (Hirst and Hopkins, 1998). 
In analysing the influence of the media leading to distorted security prices, we 
investigate towards the media coverage on United Airlines in the period of 
09.08.2008 until 09.14.2008, a period in which the United Airlines stock was 
undervalued due to a previous false news report about the bankruptcy of the airline. 
Among other interesting findings, we find that an excessively negative tone in the 
news coverage regarding United Airlines resulted in the sentiment of investors 
becoming excessively negative. By the help of this case study, we display the 
influence of media on human irrationality on prices in financial markets, and 
determine negative investor sentiment to be the main cause responsible for the 
























This thesis analyses the extent of irrational human behaviour in the financial 
world, and the implications that these behaviours have on prices in financial markets 
as a whole. Because this research covers various fields, from general economic 
theory, over human cognition and group decision making to power of the media, we 
start out by explaining the link between these areas, by integrating individual and 
collective cognition into economic theory.  
Doing so, we show how an individual’s cognition is influenced by its peers and 
the surrounding, leading to group decision-making, a process in which individuals 
subordinate their own beliefs under the generalized belief of the group. In this regard 
a special focus will be put in analysing the effects that the media has in influencing 
the minds of the masses. We will then go on to investigate towards the effects that 
irrational investor behaviour has on the prices of believed to be efficient financial 
markets. 
In these introductory sections, this theses complements to behavioural, 
financial and economic literature by explaining the impact of individual cognition 
within these already established theories and explaining the role the media has in 
influencing collective cognition and therefore altering prices in financial markets. 
While most of recent research in cognitive science has focused on forming 
hypotheses and models of cognition and subjecting them to experimentation 
(Bourgine, 2004), this theses contributes to behavioural and financial research by 
testing the impacts of certain behaviour paradigms in the case of the United Airline 
Stock undervaluation in September 2008. Doing so, we empirically analyse the 
course of this undervaluation, the context in which it occurred and which cognitive 
phenomena might be responsible for the undervaluation. By means of textual 
analysis of media coverage regarding United Airlines throughout this episode we 
explain the influence of the media leading to this mispricing, and ultimately define 
excessively negative investor sentiment resulting from this media coverage to be the 
main reason for this undervaluation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The human brain is without a doubt one of the most interesting and fascinating 
fields of studies: The power that the brain has over the rest of the body can be seen 
by the example of the “Placebo Effect”, where hopeless patients suffering of severe 
diseases ranging from cancer to Parkinson, have been cured by the sole treatment of 
plain sugar pills. Only because these patients strongly believe in the efficiency of the 
“drug”, as if by magic, they actually cure their disease by themselves. This effect 
illustrating the power about the human brain over the rest of the body can therefore 
be described as the “most effective medication known to science, subjected to more 
clinical trials than any other medicament yet nearly always doing better than 
anticipated. The range of susceptible conditions appears to be limitless”(O´Donell, 
1995 p.1).  
The placebo effect outlines the power that perceptions about what is believed 
to be true have not only over the body, but also over general human behaviour and 
emotions or decision-making. In this sense, psychologists as well as economists 
have been studying various cognitive phenomena in order to understand certain 
putatively completely irrational human behaviours for long periods of time. These 
behaviours are extremely interesting to observe in a business context; an area in 
which rational decision making in order to opportunistically maximize value is one of 
the main postulates for success (Bourgine, 2004). We will therefore integrate 
individual and cognitive processes and their particular constraints into economic 
theory both on individual, and collective level.  As we will see throughout this paper, 
by analysing the behaviour of financial market participants, certain putatively 
completely irrational behaviours become understandable and might even turn out to 
be rational.  
This thesis analyses the extent of irrational human behaviour in the financial 
world, and the implications that these behaviours have on financial markets as a 
whole. In this sense, a focus will also be put on the emotions leading individuals to 
make certain putatively completely irrational investment decisions. As we will see, 
throughout the process of price finding for securities, general investor sentiment as “a 
belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at 
hand”(Baker and Wurgler, 2007) regarding the economy in general or about a certain 
security in specific play a vital role. We will analyse in depth, how negative investor 
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sentiment evolves and which impact the media has in generating it: Different media 
sources are accessible regardless of place and time, due to technological progress 
over time.  It is extremely challenging for the human brain to distinguish from which 
sources of media to rely on, in a world where one is confronted with numerous 
different, partially contradicting information and opinions (Engelberg and Parsons, 
2011). In this sense the impact of the media not only on the efficiency of markets, but 
also on the sentiment of financial market participants are analysed. 
This paper builds up on existing literature on behavioural finance theory. Here 
a special focus will be put on the effects of negative affectivity, as humans prove to 
wrongly assess risk due to a misperception of reality resulting from negative 
emotions. Because human emotions and irrationalities only effect financial markets 
when the masses as a whole adapt certain behaviours, a focus will be put in 
understanding how certain human mind sets and behavioural paradigms are adapted 
by many people, leading to “group think” or even mass movements, ultimately 
distorting prices on financial markets.   
Whereas most behavioural economics models are quite abstract and 
theoretical, this theses complements research by the means of empirical qualitative 
and quantitative research. In this sense, this thesis builds up on previous research 
from the area of behavioural economics. We analyse various relevant behavioural 
economics theories and bring them into context of real life financial markets. Doing 
so, we empirically analyse and validate the implications of various behavioural 
finance models by analysing the mispricing of United Airline (UAL) Stock in 
September 2008: On September 8th of 2008, a six-year old newspaper article about 
United Airlines filing for Chapter 11 was mistakenly republished online. The market 
reacted with a plunge of the airline`s share price from $12 to $3, which can be seen 
as a sign for efficient markets, in which the new information is incorporated into the 
new price. Yet, only shortly after, this information was revised, and it took six trading 
days for the share price to return to pre-event levels. This intensive case study 
analyses all factors contributing to the undervaluation of this security. We will do an 
in depth analysis of the previously explained theories on behavioural economics, and 
analyse the role of the media in this surrounding, and the implications that is has on 
behaviour of agents. Among other interesting human information processing 
phenomena and emotions, we will identify negative investor sentiment due to 
	   3	  
excessively negative media coverage in this episode to be one of the main 
explanations for this mispricing puzzle.   
This thesis is built up as follows: After an outline about group information 
processing, the implications that human cognition has on financial markets will be 
explained in chapter 3. Doing so, the efficiency and limitations of financial markets 
will be explained from a behavioural perspective. The following fourth chapter 
explains the role of the media in influencing the perceptions of humans, and how they 
can affect prices on financial markets. We will then go on by constructing an in-depth 
analysis of the case of the United Airline Stock undervaluation from the period of 
09.08.2008 until 09.14.2008. 
 
2.GROUP INFORMATION PROCESSING 
2.1	  Emotional	  Convergence	  
 
This thesis investigates towards how human mind-sets, their perceptions and 
emotions effect their economical actions and decisions. In this sense, every human 
being is unique in which motivational forces and rationalities drive him/her to act in a 
certain way. Yet, humans show certain behavioural paradigms and patterns in their 
actions. (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, Dolan, 2006) In order to analyse the 
effects of human (ir)rationality on the marketplace, it is necessary to analyse the 
whole of market participants, by aggregating individual behaviour to behaviour of the 
masses.   
Experimental studies on different reference groups such as people in 
relationships or college roommates as done by Anderson and John (2003) have 
proven that people in fact converge in their emotional mind-set. By the help of 
coordination of certain thoughts and behaviours, mutual understanding and 
agreement is increased. This in turn leads to stronger emotional similarity, which 
brings about certain benefits such as cohesiveness in decision-making and problem 
solving (Anderson and John, 2003). These studies prove how originally unique 
human beings converge to be more alike to their peers, influencing their perceptions, 
opinions and decisions.  
The effects that the surrounding has on ones own actions can be compared to 
individual behaviour in groups: Despite the benefits of discursive decision-making of 
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heterogeneous groups, groups in practice tend to adapt to a behavioural 
phenomenon called “Group Think”(Janis, 1972).  Due to the diversity in opinions, 
perspectives, talents and insights, groups should be better in decision-making than 
individuals by themselves. The full use of all the information available to the group by 
exchanging, discussing and integrating the information distributed over the group 
members in theory leads to a superior decision making. Yet, research shows that 
groups in practice are poor users of this distributed information, as individuals focus 
more on already evident common knowledge or assumptions. Because group 
members are oftentimes not as open to new information, too easily satisfied with an 
emerging consensus and hesitant to move against this consensus, a low level of 
information elaboration, following low-quality decisions is very common (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2010). Groups fail to discuss individual group members’ unique 
information, but instead rather focus more on information known to all members 
before discussion (Stasser and Titus 1985). The “group think” phenomenon can 
therefore serve as theoretical basis, explaining how it is possible that originally 
unique humans merge in their opinions and especially actions towards a “mainstream” 
consensus. 
 
2.2	  Groupthink	   	  
 
Irving Janis (1972) first published his idea of “Groupthink” as a form of group 
behaviour, in which involved individuals limit the thinking for themselves. Janis 
analyses what occurred in the Kennedy White House before the Bay of Pigs invasion 
by means of psychoanalytic understanding of the structural characteristics of the 
organizational context, in which the CIA representatives dominated the decision 
making process. Based on his findings, he coins the term groupthink as “a mode of 
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, 
when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative course of action” (Janis, 1982 p.9)  
Groupthink can be considered a feature of a “basic assumption group” as 
coined by Bion (1952). In this basic assumption group, instead of processing 
information to reflect on risk and return as external realities/conditions, agents treat 
information from outside of the group only as “background noise”, ignoring 
alternatives, and feeling secure by everyone doing the same. In this sense, group 
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members are afraid of being left out and are instead united by their common belief in 
a supporting “cover story”. In contrast to a basic assumption group, a “Work Group” 
is defined as one in which each individual thinks for himself, and uses the group to 
test and elaborate rather than to conform. 
Groupthink stands for an excessive form of concurrence seeking among 
members of high prestige groups. It is excessive because group members value the 
group and being part of the group extremely high. Members strive for quick and 
smooth unanimity on the issues that the group confronts, also by suppressing 
personal doubts. A strong confidence in the inherent morality of the group, combined 
with an evil picture of the groups opponents serve as justification for silencing 
dissenters. Depending on the surrounding, this can lead to dramatic consequences 
such as a distorted view of reality, excessive optimism producing hasty and reckless 
policies, or neglect of ethical issues. Because of these weaknesses and reduced self-
questioning and self-reflecting, these groups are kin to initiate certain projects that 
result in fiascos. A grouping is especially vulnerable to groupthink, when its members 
are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions and 
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Figure 1: Groupthink theory: A model.
  
Source: Janis, (1982)  
The flowchart above explains the operational and causal connection between 
antecedents, indicators and effects: The decision makers constitute a cohesive group 
by taking advantage of structural faults of the organization in a proactive situational 
context. The tendency of concurrence seeking then leads to the groupthink with its 
characteristics such as overestimation of the group, closed-mindness and pressures 
toward uniformity. These mechanisms usually lead to defective decision making with 
low probability of succeeding (Janis 1982). 
From a psychoanalytical perspective, a conflict in mind takes place, leading to 
a “divided rationality”: Instead of experiencing emotional conflict, agents cut 
themselves off from being aware of it, in order not to feel frustrated nor anxious and 
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be able to excitedly take on certain behaviours without feeling bad about them 
(Tucket, 2009). This divided rationality is contrasting to an “integrated state” of mind, 
in which the human being thinks about themselves, others and other things more or 
less objectively the way they are. Certain attributes produce mixed feelings including 
guilt and regret. As this realistic appraisal of the surrounding including the previous 
attributes are not present in a “divided” state, a person in a divided state does not 
experience the consequences of their own imperfections.    
As we will see throughout this theses, the price-finding in stock markets can 
be compared to a group decision making, as the market as a collective brings about 
information and opinions from many individuals, aggregates them, ultimately resulting 
in an equilibrium price, which could be seen as the group consensus. Examples of 
evident group think mechanisms in financial markets, as well as the possible 
consequences and responses after detecting this will be outlined. Many of the 
previously outlined characteristics of “group think” are present in the UAL case, 
leading to the poor decision making, ultimately resulting in extreme undervaluation of 
the UAL Stock in September 2008. In this episode, the masses (“groups”) have taken 
on excessively negative perceptions about reality, and were no longer capable of 
making reasonable judgments about the fundamental value of the stock. Based on 
Janis’ definition of Groupthink, it becomes evident, that Investors striving for 
unanimity have overridden their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course 
of action for a very long period of time.  
 
2.3	  Negative	  Affectivity 
 
The fact that emotions and moods play a great role in individual as well as 
collective behaviour has been scientifically proven and is undeniable (Andrade, 2009). 
The general concept of affect captures the disposition to experience positive and 
negative feelings as well as positive and negative transition mood states (Watson 
and Tellegen, 1985). Affective states have an important signalling function, as they 
signal whether a certain state or thing requires attention and potential action, or if it is 
satisfactory. In this sense, moods are considered as low-intensity affective states, 
which do not have the intensity of emotions, and are actually associated with more 
extensive information processing. Emotions, which are more intense, usually rather 
short-lived and in contrast to diffuse moods have a distinct cause, are problematic as 
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they are associated with impaired cognitive capacity for information processing. 
Extremes such as clinical levels of negative affectivity e.g. can lead to dysfunctional 
consequences. 
Negative affectivity could be described as the disposition to experience 
subjective distress (Watson and Clark, 1984). In this sense, the disposition to 
feelings such as sadness, guilt, nervousness etc. contributes to the level of 
experienced negative affectivity. There has even been research suggesting that 
moderate levels of negative affectivity are actually associated with more careful and 
extensive information processing as well as openness and attention to new 
information (van Knippenberg et al, 2010). By an evidence-driven (rather than 
preference driven) processing-style, which focuses on external/situational relevant 
information, moderate levels of negative affectivity indirectly influence the cognitive 
effort and processing capacity. Especially in group decision-making, the positive 
effects of moderately high levels of negative affectivity may even motivate more 
appropriate responses to certain situations by improved information processing (van 
Knippenberg et al, 2010). Yet, these previous findings are highly disputable.  There 
has been contrary line of research suggesting that positive affectivity is more efficient 
in bringing about desirable outcomes, by increased cooperation and coordination 
within groups, ( Barsade et al., 2000) , or by increased creativity (Baas, De Dreu and 
Nijstad, 2008). Additional research seems to prove that positive moods lead to group 
members making better use of their distributed information due to cognitive flexibility 
of happy individuals yielding improved results (Bramesfeld and Gasper 2008). 
Research on negative affectivity has shown that negative affect renders 
individuals to be more risk avoidant in their decision-making (Williams, Zainuba and 
Jackson, 2003) From this it is possible to conclude that negative effect is less 
conductive to performance in certain surroundings such as research and 
development teams, that highly rely on creativity, but also the finance industry in 
which agents need to take certain calculated risks.  
Based on the fact that the UAL stock was drastically undervalued in the 
regarded period of September 2008, we conclude that investors were not able to 
make reasonable judgements about the true value of the stock. Based on the 
previously outlined theory, we expect this to be due to strong negative emotions, 
which negatively influence the human cognitive capacity for information processing. 
But how can it be possible that this negative affective state of investors becomes 
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established, and how is it possible that certain (irrational) investor behaviours actually 
influence security prices in efficient markets, letting them diverge from the former 
market equilibrium? Based on the assumption that financial markets are efficient, the 
limits to this efficiency are analysed by investigating towards the effect that 
apparently irrational human behaviours in practice prove to have on financial markets.  
 
3. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
3.1	  The	  Efficient	  Market	  Hypothesis	  
 
The Efficient Market Hypotheses (EMH) as defined by Eugene Fama in 1970, 
defines an efficient financial Market as one in which security prices always fully 
reflect the available information. Therefore, actual market prices reflect the 
fundamental values of securities. The rationale is that as soon as information arises, 
it is spread very quickly and incorporated into security prices without delay. Because 
of this, the only determinants of security prices are their fundamental values, 
calculated as the present value of discounted expected future cash flows. The 
expected profit of holding a security is a function of the securities risk (Fama, 1970). 
The EMH is divided into the semi-strong form, stating that prices reflect all publicly 
available information, and the strong form, stating that none of the market 
participants can generate long-term excess returns through any kind of analysis. 
In compliance with the EMH, the random walk model states that successive 
price changes are independent from one another and identically distributed (Fama, 
1965). Only the emergence of new, unpredictable, information will lead to a change 
in stock prices. Following this logic, the change of a stock price in the future is 
independent from previous price changes, and unpredictable. Because of this, it is 
not possible for any investor to generate abnormal returns by technical analysis (The 
attempt to predict future stock prices by studying past stock prices) or by 
fundamental analysis. The inability of professional money managers to beat the 
market as proven by Rubenstein in 2001 is seen as strong evidence of the EMH 
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
Markets are efficient because of the competition among investors: Investors 
spend time and resources in the attempt to identify mispriced securities. Doing so, 
competing investors buy and sell these mispriced securities, making the prices 
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converge to an equilibrium efficient price in the long run. Mispricings are assumed 
not to last, and abnormal returns are only possible by chance. Because of this 
efficiency, informed as well as uninformed investors generate equal levels of profits, 
which are a function of a security`s risk. In consistency with this, financial theory 
generally states that there is  “No free lunch” in stock markets.  
One reason for the popularity of the EMH is that it rationalizes the finance 
industry on the base of rational individuals. Yet, humans as economic agents are 
error-prone, with judgement mistakes and other sentiments leading to a range of 
important anomalies. 
As we will see in the analysis of the United Airlines case from 2008, sharp 
price movements underline the efficiency of markets. Stock prices react by 
incorporating the impact of new information immediately. In the case of a news 
release regarding the fundamental value of a security, it is expected that stock prices 
move quickly towards a new equilibrium price, which incorporates the new 
information. If this news turns out to be false, a price revision, back to previous levels 
as soon as the correction of the false news is released is expected.  
 
3.2	  Anomalies	  challenging	  the	  Efficient	  Market	  Hypothesis	  
  
Throughout time, the intellectual dominance of the efficient market hypothesis 
became far less popular, as many financial economists and statisticians started 
believing that stock prices are at least partially predictable. In this sense, the 
psychological and behavioural elements of stock price determination play an 
important role. These economists challenging the EMH have found evidence that by 
the help of predictable patterns, investors are able to earn excess risk-adjusted rates 
of return (Malkiel, 2003). 
One of the main important patterns challenging the EMH, which have been 
found, is the “Post Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD)”. The PEAD phenomenon 
has first been reported by the two accounting professors Philip Brown and Ray Bale 
in 1968, who observed that markets react sharply to earnings announcements over 
the course of a few days and then continue drifting in the same direction for various 
months (Ball and Brown, 1968). In contradiction to the EMH, stating that stock 
markets have no memory (The way stock markets behaved in the past is not useful 
in divining how it will behave in the future), the PEAD describes a phenomenon in 
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which the contrary is the case. Whereas theory would expect sharp stock price 
movements within minutes, following stability until new news releases, the empirical 
findings are contradictory and they therefore also seem to offer an arbitrage 
opportunity: A rational investor could create a hedged portfolio that is long in firm(s) 
that have just announced good news and short in firms that have announced bad 
news, resulting in risk-free returns from no net investment (Bloomfield, 2006). The 
understanding of this arbitrage opportunity should theoretically lead competing 
investors to buy this PEAD portfolio, and drive prices to an equilibrium, in which 
these excess returns are eliminated. Yet, this phenomenon has proven to be robust 
in practice.  
The PEAD is only one of many pricing anomalies, each of which is 
controversial and explained by different approaches. Among the most puzzling, EMH 
contradicting phenomena are: 
§ The equity premium puzzle: The returns on equities seem to be far too high in 
comparison to bonds even when accounting for the additional associated risk 
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985). 
§ Excessive volatility: Market prices have proven to be excessively volatile 
relative to the volatility of fundamentals (Shiller, 1981). 
§ Excessive volume: Trade volume is far too high than can be explained by new 
fundamental information or non-informational motivations such as liquidity 
need or risk hedging (Kendel and Pearson, 1995). 
§ The accruals anomaly: Firms with large positive accruals earn lower future 
returns than firms without small positive accruals (Sloan, 1996). 
§ The momentum effect: The tendency for rising asset prices to rise further and 
for falling asset prices to fall further (Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
 
There have been many attempts to explain these previously listed as well as 
other pricing anomalies such as our regarded UAL under-pricing case e.g. by the 
help of risk premiums or liquidity preferences of investors, yet almost all of these 
explanations have failed. As we will see, there are certain limitations to investors in 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities, as we will see in the following section. Yet, 
depending on the concrete market anomaly (e.g. UAL under-pricing in September 
2008), it is oftentimes more likely that irrational investor behaviour is responsible for 
these anomalies, and will therefore be examined in section 3.4. 
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3.3	  Limits	  to	  arbitrage	  
  
As outlined in the previous section, investors make systematic trading errors 
that result in mispricing. In line with the EMH, the question naturally evolves of why 
don’t smart traders exploit these errors, by buying under-priced and selling over-
priced securities, therefore driving prices to appropriate levels? And how is it possible 
that obviously mispriced securities don’t converge to an equilibrium price, but instead 
diverge even further from the fundamental value, as proven by the momentum 
effect?   
Great parts of this puzzle can be explained by the theory of limited arbitrage, 
which states that certain other risk factors, which are not captured as risk factors in 
traditional asset pricing models, prove to limit the possibility of arbitrage.  These risks 
are incorporated in the theory of “noise trader risk”: Because of temporary price 
movements even further away from fundamental value due to irrational “noise 
traders”, the value of an arbitrage portfolio may decline. Even though the arbitrage 
opportunity is greater, the further the price is away from fundamental value, fund 
managers are oftentimes forced to liquidate their positions. They are therefore not 
able to take advantage of an apparent arbitrage opportunity. This is because the 
investors of these funds evaluate them on short-term performance, and might 
withdraw their investments because they see short-term losses as signs for poor 
investment strategy (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002). Besides this, professional 
arbitrageurs face liquidity problems in practice due to the “holding costs” they are 
facing: The proceeds from short-selling an overpriced asset, as well as additional 
collateral (which could otherwise be invested more profitably) are put into a minimal 
or no interest paying margin account. These additional holding costs also include the 
relative performance evaluation of fund managers or the risk that the lender of a 
security might recall the asset (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002).  
Besides these limits to arbitrage, a model constructed by Dilip Abreu and 
Markus Brunnermeier (2002) proves that even for rational investors, in certain 
situations it might be more lucrative to exacerbate pricing errors rather than to 
counteract against them: In a situation in which irrational traders drove security prices 
too high, even rational traders might “ride the bubble”, therefore continuously 
enlarging it. The rationale is that a rational arbitrageur does not know weather other 
arbitrageurs have recognized this mispricing yet, and therefore expect the mispricing 
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to last temporarily. The consequence, is a “delayed arbitrage”, in which mispricing is 
resistant to arbitrage in the short and intermediate run. The risk resulting from the 
unpredictable timing of how long a mispricing holds is termed “synchronization risk” 
(Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002, p.341-344). 
Besides these risks, in contrast to theory about perfect capital markets, in 
reality any kind of arbitrage involves some risk because markets are not complete in 
practice. Only if a perfect substitute for a mispriced security existed, arbitrageurs 
would be able to fully hedge their arbitrage positions. Because of these “imperfect 
hedges”, arbitrageurs fear a fundamental risk arising from the fact that the 
fundamental value of a hedged portfolio might change over time (Abreu and 
Brunnermeier, 2002).  
In addition, there are a variety of other costs, uncertainties and limitations 
challenging the EMH due to the fact that financial markets are not perfect in practice. 
The EMH is based on a set of assumptions: Fama defines (i) no transaction costs in 
trading securities, (ii) all available information is available costless to all market 
participants, and (iii) all agree on the implications of current information for the 
current price and distributions of future prices for each security, as sufficient 
conditions for market efficiency (Fama, 1970 p.387). The empirical contradiction to 
these theoretical assumptions is obvious. The reality of imperfect financial markets 
including asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and moral hazard, 
limited commitment, supply not equalling demand, and incomplete markets regarding 
product offering highly restrict the efficiency of markets. 
Because of these previously outlined examples of inefficiency, as well as the 
limits and restrictions that market participants face in exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities, it becomes clear why certain market anomalies prove to hold over 
noticeable periods of time. While greater parts of market research and financial 
literature intends to explain these anomalies by focusing on market frictions and 
restrictions, we focus on the “behavioural decision theory” branch of psychology, as it 
turns out to be very well suited to explaining this problem. Researchers have shown 
“that a variety of apparently irrational behaviours can be explained by a relatively 
parsimonious set of theories” (Bloomfield, 2006 p.5). In this sense, empirical and 
experimental studies have proven that the results from these behavioural theories of 
emotional finance can describe individual investor actions and explain great parts of 
the previously outlined market anomalies.  
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3.4	  Emotional	  Finance	  
 
Financial markets are subject to human feelings such as greed, over-
excitement, anxiety and panic in divided states of mind. In this sense, they produce 
subjective and neurobiological experience, creating the context for decision-making.  
Emotional finance is built up on the idea that economic agents make certain 
decisions based on the context and their subjective experience over time.  Because 
of these propositions about human behaviour, agents make different decisions even 
if they have the same available information. In this sense, changing preferences, 
experiences, influences or signals can alter or even reverse personal valuation. Only 
if agents share the same experiences, context etc., they will make the same 
decisions (Tucket, 2009).  
Decisions can never be taken completely rationally, but are always subject to 
“Animal Spirits” as defined by Keynes (1936). Because decision-making is also 
based on macro-economic and wider psychological context-sentiment, it could be 
called extra-rational rather than irrational (Tucket, 2009). In this sense, feelings are 
also not irrational. Instead, they could rather be considered as a part of human 
adaptive capacity, influencing the decision making process. These feelings have a 
strong impact on professional investors, as they are humans main source of 
motivation, also for traders or fund managers. Without the feeling one gets from a 
certain activity, the activity itself actually has little point in doing. In this sense, 
financial markets are very abstract and cannot be enjoyed for themselves. Simplified, 
the only value of a security (and the feeling resulting from realizing this value) comes 
from the price it can be sold for. Because this price and its fluctuations can be 
observed anytime, financial decisions inalienably involve high ambivalence and 
stress characterized by inherent uncertainty. This leads to high emotional 
involvement, with prices strongly influencing the feelings and affect of market 
participants. The fact that it is extremely difficult to distinguish luck from good 
judgment in valuing financial decisions causes additional stress and the brain is 
fooled in its information processing. From a behavioural perspective it now becomes 
clear that market participants are limited in their cognitive abilities in making rational 
decisions. We see the great impact that not only emotions, but also the influence of 
the surrounding on an individual’s decision-making process.  
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3.4.1	  Group	  Think	  in	  financial	  Markets	  (Bubble	  evolvement)	  
 
The stock crash of 2008 and the following worldwide financial crisis can be 
seen as an ideal example for emotions influencing decision making and groupthink in 
financial markets: Various economic factors such as trade imbalances, excess 
liquidity, depression of risk premia, sinking real estate prices etc. contributed to the 
economic disequilibrium leading to loss of confidence in financial markets resulting in 
a stock market crash following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. While all of these 
economically evident and rationally intuitive factors certainly explain stock market 
behaviour until a certain point, investigating human behaviour and human information 
processing shows that human factors are more adequate to understand the root 
cause of this crash. Human behaviour is always characterized by personal thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours, meaning that these personal factors are necessarily also 
present in financial markets (Tucket, 2009). As we will see in further sections 
regarding the role of the media, as soon as a certain security becomes focus of 
attention, a collective hype or pessimism can evolve extremely quickly. As we have 
seen, judgment decisions about the assessment of risk and success can be 
systematically comprised to the fact that excitement of potential gains is 
disconnected from the anxiety of potential losses. Aggregated, this can lead to 
groupthink phenomenon and can consequence in price bubbles. Throughout this 
process, beliefs about the value of a security are modified and the normal sense of 
balance between risk and return is replaced by the  “generalized belief”.  
This same mechanism took place in the bubble preceding the crash in 2008, 
when various agents such as investment fund managers, banks, or insurance 
companies were offered the opportunity to increase their returns be securitizing loans 
in increasingly complex, oftentimes even unintelligible packages. The doubts about 
these packages were dismissed or rationalized, and replaced by excitement about 
excess returns or even euphoria. But not only these professional money managers, 
but also the wide masses became victims of this group think: Individuals bought real 
estate at prices higher than they could ever afford, taking on excessive debt, without 
questioning whether they will ever be able to repay their mortgages, only because of 
the generalized belief that everyone could benefit from ever rising real-estate values. 
Only after long periods of increased discomfort, these packages were questioned, 
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finally resulting in a panic. These bubbles usually burst not because new information 
becomes available but rather because what has always been available to be known 
becomes salient in a way it can no longer be ignored. Collective blaming of those 
who are putatively responsible for the whole process is characteristic for the 
aftermath. Personal guilt is not present, and individual contribution to the process 
excused by alleged necessity to follow the trend (Tucket, 2009). 
John Milton Keynes addressed this tendency of people to conform to the 
average, mainstream judgment. He termed “conventional judgment” to be caused by 
“the psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy the 
others”(Keynes, 1936 p.214). Attempting to understand the psychological 
mechanisms behind this behaviour, Tucket (2009) argues that information is 
processed in different ways in different states of mind. Depending on the mental 
context, in a “divided” state of mind, agents think about what they know differently: 
Situations of excitement and euphoria interfere with, and to a certain level replace, 
calculation and due diligence. Stories about exceptional success catches them and is 
embraced into their thinking, making them unable to reflect enough or worry about 
the potential risks in place. As outlined, in the context of euphoria and pessimism in 
financial markets, people do not think for themselves but engage in the previously 
described groupthink. The previously mentioned “cover story” in this context was the 
idea that a new financial architecture had actually changed the nature of risk, that 
banks don’t need as much equity capital as before and that returns could actually be 
higher for ever. Most of the involved agents become part of a “basic assumption 
group”, incapable of questioning if something “fantastic” is actually happening, 
therefore operating with a divided sense of rationality (Tucket, 2009).  
It is oftentimes difficult to distinguish whether a certain “fantastic” outcome is 
actually true or only a fantasy: Experiments have proven that fantasies can produce 
electrical and chemical activity in our brain that is almost the same as would occur if 
they were actually lived (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). It could even be said, that 
“markets are not well organized to manage the power that financial assets have to 
generate emotion and their wider effect on human imagination and judgement, 
anchored in neurobiology”(Tucket, 2009 p.1). The evolvement of bubbles, resulting 
from the fact that people oftentimes engage in “group think”, instead of thinking for 
themselves can be explained by peoples (un)confidence in their own capabilities. 
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3.4.2.	  Miscalibrated	  confidence	  
  
Whereas traditional financial models of trade assume that agents have 
confidence reflecting the precision of their information, the empirics have proven that 
people only rarely show this characteristic: People tend to overestimate their ability to 
predict certain events when they have little or poor information. Surprisingly, people 
tend to be under confident in their ability to answer easy questions. Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) have coined this cognitive psychology phenomenon as the “hard-
easy effect”. While their research was based on asking people hard and easy 
questions, financial research on financial markets come to the same conclusions: 
People are overconfident in their ability to predict hardly predictable markets, which 
can be shown proven by the excessive trade volume phenomenon (Odean, 1999). In 
regard to market reactions to information, Daniel, Hirschleifer and 
Subrahmanyam(1997) have proven that  markets underreact to new information due 
to investors overconfidence in their previous beliefs. Further research by Daniel et al. 
(1998) has proven that traders overestimate their own ability of collecting precise 
information. Empirical examples from financial markets such as executives’ failure to 
exercise stock options before expiration, can be seen as overconfidence of people in 
their own abilities. As a result, investors overreact to private information while 
underreacting to public information. The previously outlined Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift paradigm can also be explained from a miscalibrated conference 
point of view as done by Bloomfild, Libby and Nelson (2003), who show that the 
PEAD comes from overconfident inferences of old earnings numbers with little 
information content once new numbers are available (Bloomfield 2006). As we will 
see in our study of the UAL undervaluation, Investors in other situations prove to be 
under-confident in their ability to exploit easily detectable arbitrage opportunities, 
while in turn being overconfident in their ability to predict extremely difficultly 
predictable scenarios.  
The level of confidence of investors in their own ability of determining certain 
values or outcomes is strongly dependent on which source they obtain their 
information from. In this sense we will analyse the impact of the media in influencing 
the perceptions of the masses for one about reality, and also regarding their own 
abilities. 
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4. Role of Media in the stock market 
 
The importance of the media in influencing and directing the perceptions, 
sentiments and expectations of the masses is undeniable, as can be seen by 
numerous examples in which old information presented by a different source show 
substantial effects even on stock prices: Huberman and Regev (2001) analyse the 
case of an article about an old scientific discovery, printed on the front page of the 
New York Times. This article had an immense impact on the stock price of EntreMed, 
the company responsible for the discovery, even though the story had occurred and 
been covered by other journals many months before. Similar mechanisms in which 
the form of how information is presented impacts stock prices become evident by 
analysing media coverage regarding United Airlines in September 2008, and certain 
putatively irrational investors behaviour actually become comprehensible. 
Market participants are constantly confronted with an extreme variety of both 
informative and uninformative news. In this sense, news can be either a piece of 
information, leading the expectations of investors towards the fundamental value, or 
solely advice for irrational investors to determine the fundamental value (Corgnet, 
Kujal, Porter, 2007). In most circumstances, relevant information and noise arise 
simultaneously and cannot be easily separated, resulting in the noise component 
affecting agents’ investment decisions (Carvalho et al., 2011). 
Markets have shown to have unique, oftentimes unexplainable mechanisms in 
assessing which information (weather informative or uninformative) to pay attention 
to. The impact of the “guru effect”, explaining that markets may be subject to 
manipulation by influential agents (Sperber, 2005) can be seen in the case of a 
Speech from Alan Greenspan on Febuary 26th, 2007: After his statement which 
contained no new information about fundamental values, “When you get this far away 
from a recession, invariably forces build up for the next recession, and indeed we are 
beginning to see that sign”, worldwide stock markets crashed, illustrating the power 
of these influential agents (Corgnet, Kujal, Porter,  2007). This simple empirical 
example shows how prone markets are to individual influence and also manipulation. 
Experimental studies show that these manipulations have very great influence only in 
the short-run, leading to the conclusion that markets learn to identify irrelevant 
information with experience. The effect of a certain information on market variables 
(Price, Trading volume, Bid-ask spread etc.) depends on its content, reliability and 
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timing. In this sense, a minimum level of reliability is necessary for a message to be 
effective. Of course, different subjects assign different levels of liability to different 
sources, based on past experience. Another necessary condition for the 
effectiveness of messages is their consistency with the subjects’ prior beliefs: 
Whereas a message can reinforce a subjects previous perception, leading to a 
reaction, a message that is not consistent with the subjects’ previous opinion may be 
disregarded (Corget et al. 2010). 
The “conservatism and representative bias” explaining that new information is 
underweighted in updating, can also be applied to financial markets: Barberis et al. 
(1998) show that slow information updating of prior beliefs result in under reaction of 
prices to new information. In contrast to that, overreaction occurs due to the 
“representativeness bias”, by which traders extrapolate trends in security prices from 
few observations (Corgnet et al., 2010). 
The role of the media in the evolvement of bubbles is extreme: When a certain 
security or other economical object that is capable of generating excitement becomes 
focus of attention, the mechanisms leading to bubbles evolve fast: A vicious circle of 
increased enthusiasm leading to increased demand, leading to increased prices, 
leading to further enthusiasm and so on can evolve practically out of nowhere. A 
mechanism of feedback takes place in which narrative rhetoric explaining the 
situation leads to a generalized belief. A cult of personality regarding the founders of 
whichever object/security/trend arises due to euphoric media coverage, resulting in 
an increased pressure for everyone to join the trend. In addition, criticizers of the 
trend are oftentimes ignored, looked down on, or even dismissed. After an 
indispensable crash, and in contrasting situations with exorbitant pessimism, the 
reverse mechanism take place, in which the responsible subjects are blamed or even 
criminalized (Tucket, 2009). The power, the media has to influence the masses in 
these situations can be explained by the limited cognitive resources of human beings.  
As we suspect the undervaluation of United Airlines in September 2008 to be 
caused by negative investor sentiment due to excessively negative media coverage, 
we will analyse in detail the media coverage of this topic in the regarded time period. 
We suspect the media coverage to have been extremely negative, giving an 
explanation for how the media was able to bias the investors in their decision-making. 
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4.1.	  Limited	  attention	  
 
Because of the fact that people have limited cognitive resources, their 
attention to (financial) information is determined by how information is presented and 
how often others talk it about. In this sense, there have been extensive experiments, 
especially in accounting research, proving that even sophisticated analysts draw their 
conclusions based on irrelevant aspects of how financial information is presented 
(Hirst and Hopkins, 1998). Certain features such as the formatting, isolation and 
ordering of text can alter investor’s attention to and weighting of the information 
(Bloomfield, 2006). Fewer investors examine the footnotes necessary to understand 
accounting information, and market prices therefore don’t completely reveal available 
information. This “incomplete revelation hypothesis” is of course a contradiction to 
the EMH, arguing that all available information is incorporated into security prices 
(Bloomfield, 2002).  
Aggregating individual limited attention to collective limited attention of the 
masses explains how certain securities come in and out of fashion. It also gives an 
explanation of the home bias puzzle: The puzzle of why investors tend to invest into 
firms of their region despite the fact that they oftentimes have lower expectations of 
success, can be partially explained by increased investor attention for local firms due 
to limited knowledge about other opportunities (Bloomfield, 2006). The phenomenon 
that firms tend to show increased trading volume when their earnings are growing 
rapidly, but being ignored when they perform poorly for long periods can also be 
explained by limited attention. Limited attention can also give an explanation for the 
fact that firms with low trading volume and strong returns show strong momentum in 
returns, while those with high trading volume and strong returns show long-term 
reversal, as argued by Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
In accessing, which information to favour and how to interpret it, several 
psychological theories and models have outlined the mechanisms of human 
information processing regarding financial decisions: Research on the Equity 
premium puzzle has shown that investors take the worst-case approach to new 
information, resulting in stronger reactions towards bad than to good news. The 
interpretation is that such behaviour leads to an “ambiguity premium” (Epstein and 
Schneider, 2008). Further research has shown that ambiguity-averse traders favour 
information that reduces ambiguity at the cost of undervaluing other valuable pieces 
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of information (Caskey, 2009). With regards to the undervaluation of United Airlines 
in September 2008, we would expect the media coverage of this aspect to be 
insufficient. We would expect the undervaluation to be partially resulting from 
uninformed investors that don’t know that UAL is not bankrupt after all, because the 
media did not inform them well enough. 
These previous sections serve as theoretical base about general behavioural 
finance, and about how the media contributes towards influencing and manipulating 
the perceptions and expectations of investors. In order to test the extent to which 
these theories are relevant in real life financial markets, we will investigate towards 
the case of the mispricing of the United Airlines stock following the false news 
release on 08.09.2008. Doing so, we will first analyse the causes of the UAL 
undervaluation, and then go on to discuss whether the previously outlined theories 
on human behaviour prove to have been present in this particular example. Here by 
means of qualitative research we will analyse the extent to which the implications of 
the previously outlined descriptive theories prove to have influenced the stock price 
of UAL. We will then expand our research on various other factors, which seem to 
have influenced the stock price evolvement of UAL stock. Also this will be done by 
qualitative analysis, taking already existing research to this phenomenon in 
consideration. As we will see, the implications of some of these theories prove to 
empirically hold, making this apparent undervaluation explainable, whereas other 
behavioural forces show to have no relevance. By the help of this case study, we will 
therefore empirically prove the existence, and verify the relevance of certain 
behavioural phenomena on real world financial markets. As we suspect negative 
investor sentiment based on excessively negative media coverage of the issue to be 
the main cause for the undervaluation, we will investigate towards this phenomenon 
in more detail, by means of quantitative research: By textually analysing the tone of 
newspaper articles towards UAL throughout this episode, we intend to quantify the 
level of negativity in the media throughout the episode, which we assume to have a 
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5. Case Study United Airlines 
5.1	  Puzzle	  of	  UAL	  Stock	  Price	  evolvement	  
 
There have been many grave mispricings throughout history such as the 
obvious overvaluations of tech firms previous to the bust of the “Dotcom Bubble” in 
2000, or the “Tulip-mania” in 1637, in which the prices for tulip bulbs rose above 
more than 10 times the annual income of a skilled craftsman due to speculative 
investors. This thesis will focus on the undervaluation of the UAL Stock in the period 
from 09.08.2008 until 09.14.2008, as it is an extremely interesting and recent 
example, in which the causes and explanations for the phenomenon can be sharply 
quantified and analysed from a behavioural perspective. 
On September 8th of 2008, the republication of a six-year old article about the 
bankruptcy of United Airlines parent company Henceforth UA resurfaced on the 
Internet, therefore leading the public to mistakenly believe that UAL was filing for 
bankruptcy again. Following this false news release, UALs stock dropped 76% in a 
few minutes, reflecting a total loss in market capitalization of over $1.1 billion. After 
the news had been identified as false, the price rebounded, yet it ended trading day 
at 11.2% below the previous day. During this day of extreme price movements, 
trading volumes skyrocketed. 
On September 7th 2008, an article first published on December 10, 2002 by 
the Chicago Tribune regarding UAL filing for bankruptcy, just like most other 
American airlines did in that period due to the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
was scanned by a Google news engine and added to the Google news pages. The 
article did not have a standard newspaper article dateline, so it was indexed as being 
new. On the following morning, an employee from an independent research firm 
forwarded the article to Bloomberg. Bloomberg went on to releasing the headline 
“United Airlines: Files for Ch.11, to cut costs by 20 per cent” on its platform at 10:53 
a.m. Within 195 seconds, UALs share price fell from $11.85 to $3.00. At 11:06 a.m. 
UAL released a denial about the false news, and the share price recovered to a price 
around $9. NASDAQ halted trading at 11:07, and reopened it at 12:30 p.m. Trading 
day ended with the share being traded at $10.92. The price of UAL share went on to 
fall even further, to a low of $9.12 on September 11. It took until September 15th for 
UAL shares to return to pre news release levels. While the sharp price reaction 
following the first publication of the news can be seen as efficient market behaviour, 
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revaluing the UAL stock after new information regarding fundamental value has been 
released, the failure of the UALs stock price to recover to previous levels after the 
UAL press release “cancelled the older news out” is rather puzzling and will be 
investigated in this theses.  
In order to examine which path UAL stock would likely have followed, 
Carvalho et al. (2011) construct a counterfactual path using a simple factor-pricing 
model for UAL’s stock return. In this sense, the model determines UAL’s (logarithmic) 
excess stock return (Stock return minus return of risk free rate) to be dependent 
linearly on the excess return of the market (as proxied by the S&P500 index, noted 
rM,t), the airline industry (as proxied by Bloomberg’s World Airline Index, noted rA,t) 
and the price of crude oil (noted r0,t). The factor weights are given by ßM, ßA and ß0, 
while c is a constant and et an error term explaining the idiosyncratic component of 
the stock return.  
rUA,t – rt = c + ßM (rM,t - rt) + ßA(rA,t - rt) + ß0(r0,t – rt) + et 
  
By the help of this model, Carvalho et al. constructed a counterfactual path, a 
path UALs stock would likely have gone in the absence of the false news release, 
and compare it to the actual path UAL stock went in this episode. 
 
Figure 2: Counterfactual analysis, United Airlines (UA) – Intraday Data 
 
Source: Carvalho et al, 2011 
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The graph shows that after three trading days, UA shares were still trading 
below the two-standard-deviation band implied by the model. Only seven days after 
the false news release, the shares traded essentially at the level predicted by the 
asset-pricing model. 
This obvious undervaluation seems unexplainable, especially because it held 
for a comparably long time period and because it seems to offer an ideal arbitrage 
opportunity, many rational investors could have taken advantage of.  
 
5.2	  Stock	  Price	  Evolvement	  of	  Competitors	  and	  Supplier	  Firms	  
 
It is very interesting to compare the behaviour of the UAL stock to the price 
path of other American airline stocks and supplier firms: Financial contagion can be 
regarded as the transmission of financial distress to other related parties. In this 
particular example related parties could be any entity who’s economical success is 
directly or indirectly dependent on the success of United Airlines such as direct 
competitors, customers, suppliers but also banks or other stakeholders. 
 In fact, research from Marshall et al. (2010) shows, that other airlines and 
suppliers also experienced large price drops following the first news release, but 
recovered quickly thereafter: By calculating the price effects of not only United 
Airlines but also on other airlines and United Airlines suppliers, a total of $4.1 billion 
was wiped out of the market values of these firms after the false news release. By 
using data for 1-min intervals from the CRSP database, Marshall et al. (2010) 
analyse the microstructure dynamics such as returns, trading volumes, bid-ask 
spreads and volatility of all firms in the airline and airline-related industries. In this 
sense, the return of UAL is compared with the returns of 14 other companies sharing 
the SIC code of 4512 (Air Transportation Scheduled) and with 17 other companies 
with the SIC code of 45XX (Air Transportation Scheduled, Air Courier Services, Air 
Transportation Non-scheduled, Airports, Flying Fields, and Airport Terminal Services) 
as well as to the SPDR S&P 500 index fund. Subsequent graph shows the graphical 
analysis of these prices: 
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Figure 3: UA, Airline Industry and Market Prices on September 8th 20081 
 
Source: Marshall, Visaltanachoti and Cooper (2010)  
 
The graph visualizes how companies in the airline industry were also affected 
by the UAL false news release. The average loss of firms with SIC code of 4512 was 
12% in its low point, the 11 a.m. interval. In contrast to UAL stock, these shares 
recovered rapidly though when it became clear that the UAL bankruptcy was not true: 
We can see that both SIC code 4512 and 45XX firms traded even above their 
opening price levels by 12.54 p.m., only two hours after the false news release.  
Analyses of the price path of suppliers of UAL, which name UAL to be an 
important customer, give similar results. Marshall et al (2010) construct a supplier 
index, with stock prices of UALs most important suppliers included. As displayed in 
Appendix 1, UAL suppliers also experienced a sharp decline of 3%, but rebounded 
quickly once it was clear that the news regarding UAL bankruptcy was false.  
 
5.3	  Possible	  explanations	  
 
There have been many situations of apparent over-and under-valuations of 
securities because of impediments to rational arbitrageurs removing this inefficiency, 
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such as short sale restrictions among others. In this UAL setting however, there are 
no apparent factors preventing prices from returning to normal levels (Marshall et al., 
2010). We must therefore search for explanations both by analysing the 
circumstances of financial markets influencing the United Airlines stock during this 
episode, and also by discussing the effects of a change in cognition.  
 
5.3.1	  Decreased	  Liquidity	  and	  divergent	  investor	  opinions	  
 
One of the possible explanations not captured in the asset-pricing model are 
the effects of decreased liquidity in this episode: Investors require a higher return on 
securities with low liquidity, which explains why they are only willing to pay less for 
them (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). The excess returns that traders realized from 
holding UALs stock during the days of undervaluation could therefore be attributed to 
be a compensation for decreased liquidity. Periods of low liquidity are characterized 
by investors increasing their bid-ask spreads to account for the increased risk 
(Carvalho, Klagge and Moench, 2009). Subsequent graph shows the bid-ask spread 
of the UAL stock on the day of the false news release. 
Figure 4a) UA Bid-Ask Spread and Volume on 8th September 2008 Prior to trading halt2  
Figure 4b) UA Bid-Ask Spread and Volume in 8th of September 2008 following the halt 
 
Source: Marshall et al. (2010) 
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As the increased bid-ask spread only significantly increased in the short time 
interval between false news release and trading halt, but returned to normal levels 
already on the same day and remained normal on the following days, one can 
exclude decreased liquidity to be the responsible for the undervaluation.  
Another good proxy for liquidity in financial markets is trading volume: UAL 
share actually experienced extreme increases in trading on September 8th, with 
average trading volume approximately four times higher than those of surrounding 
days. Increased volume can also be seen as a proxy for divergent investors opinions: 
The greater the differences in opinion regarding the true value of the stock and its 
future price, the higher should be the trading volume (Marshall et al 2010). As 
outlined in previous sections, the presence of noise traders can drive the prices of 
securities down for a considerable period of time. In such an environment, in which 
many noise traders sell UAL share, and where this selling pressure is offset by the 
buying of rational investors who identified the UAL news release as false, an 
increase in trading volume would be the consequence. Yet, this only occurred on 
September 8th , but not in the following days, implying that investors’ opinions were 
actually very coherent, in assessing the stock to not be undervalued (Marshall et al., 
2010). As these explanations based on market imperfections and decreased liquidity 
do not hold, we will now focus on explaining the pricing anomaly by investigating 
towards the general investment environment in September 2008.  
 
5.3.2	  Investment	  Environment	  in	  September	  2008	  
 
One of the most straight forward explanations for this undervaluation comes 
from the context in which this episode occurred: This UAL episode occurred one 
week before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which marks the beginning of the 
financial crisis leading to a worldwide economic recession. These were special 
circumstances in the American financial environment, characterized by changes in 
market perceptions about the health of the U.S. financial sector, due to high 
borrowing needs in a surrounding of tightening borrowing constraints and lending 
standards (Carvalho et al., 2011). Yet, by analysing that other airlines rebounded 
quickly and that the market (S&P 500 index) only experienced low drops (below 1%), 
one comes to the conclusion that general investor fear regarding the equity market 
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cannot be responsible for the long lasting undervaluation of UAL stock. In addition, 
by analysing the CBOE S&P 500 market volatility index, which is commonly referred 
to as “investor fear gauge”, it becomes clear that the index was at levels similar to the 
10-year average in the period of the UAL under-pricing. This seems to exclude the 
possibility of general investor fear as an explanation for the lasting under-pricing 
(Marshall et al 2010). As also this explanation fails, we must address ourselves to 
other alternative explanations, focused more on human cognition and information 
processing. 
 
5.3.3	  Miscalibrated	  confidence	  
 
The concept of miscalibrated confidence outlined in section 2.4, demonstrates 
that human beings have an extremely puzzling distribution of confidence in their own 
abilities. As outlined, they oftentimes overestimate their abilities to predict 
unpredictable outcomes, but in turn oftentimes have extremely weak confidence in 
their ability to answer very easy questions. Even though the degree of self-
confidence of investors during the UAL episode to define the true value of UAL stock 
is not measureable years afterwards, we will go as far as stating that investors must 
have excessively underrated their own ability to determine the fundamental value of 
UAL. Any first year finance student would be able to tell that the failure of UAL stock 
price to return to previous levels represents a clear arbitrage opportunity. Even 
though many investors surely realized this, the failure of the stock price to return to 
previous levels and the lacking increase in trading volume in the subsequent days 
shows that these same investors obviously did not have confidence in their ability to 
spot a so obviously under-priced security. This failure of investors to think for 
themselves becomes explainable with the knowledge of groupthink mechanisms, in 
which individuals fail to question the overall generalized belief. Here the media 
contributes to the masses perceptions about the health of United Airlines by negative 
reporting. As a result, individuals do not have enough confidence in their ability to 
spot the arbitrage opportunity. Yet, this lack in confidence is not measurable now 
because of the time lag between the mispricing episode and this research, and could 
also be attributed to investors’ ambiguity aversion. We will therefore go as far as 
stating that miscalibrated confidence is a strong factor contributing to the 
undervaluation of UAL stock, without being able to prove it. We therefore propose 
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further research to be done on miscalibrated confidence in respect to financial 
markets to be done. Here qualitative interviews of leading fund managers and other 
investors at the exact moment of certain market anomalies could make the concept 
of miscalibrated confidence and the implications it has on certain concrete cases 
more quantifiable.  
 
5.3.4	  Ambiguity	  aversion	  
	  
The idea of ambiguity aversion regarding financial markets builds up on 
Epstein and Schneider’s (2008) model, stating that investors take a worst-case 
assessment of the quality or precision of news, when they face news of uncertain 
quality. In a situation characterized by investors having to rely on news of uncertain 
or bad quality, the negative impact on prices can be significant. The rational is that 
uncertainty-averse investors require a premium for holding such an asset, leading to 
decreased prices. In this sense they also react more strongly to bad than to good 
news. Investigating the UAL episode, we can conclude that the false news release, 
followed by a revision, is a clear deterioration in the information quality regarding 
United Airlines. The following undervaluation of UAL stock can therefore be seen as 
inevitable market reaction to the uncertainty of news quality. Because of this 
uncertainty, traders are concerned that they might be trading with better-informed 
investors. As a result they increase their Bid-Ask spreads in the period of highest 
uncertainty (Luini, 2012).  
As we have seen in the graph above, the increase in spread is only of 
extremely short duration, as the bid-ask spreads returned to normal levels already 
shortly after the trading halt. Ambiguity aversion can therefore explain the short-term 
undervaluation of the stock, yet does not give us an explanation how this 
undervaluation could last for so long. Because also this market based explanation, as 
a result of rational investors assessing the risk of a stock, proves to not give a 
justification for the (long-term) undervaluation of the stock, we will now go on to 
analysing explanations from a rather cognitive approach, taking humans bounded 
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5.3.5	  Emotional	  Relationships	  	  
 
It has been proven that investors create mental relationships to stocks. It is 
very common to hear traders, brokers or other investors say phrases such as “I love 
this stock” or “This security drives me crazy”. When investors commit to an 
investment strategy, they implicitly commit to an imagined relationship in which gains 
and losses generate feelings such as pleasure and pain. In this sense, psychologists 
postulate imagined emotional relationships as governed by loving, hating and 
knowing or anti-knowing. In the case of a bubble or a crash, an investor is prone to 
love or hate a certain stock, but unlikely to “know” in the sense that the reality is 
appreciated and valued for itself.  
Investors in a “divided” state of mind split opposed, conflicted, or ambivalent 
perceptions towards people, objects or even stocks into entirely separate, and 
oftentimes exaggerated, feelings of love or hate. Investors in such a divided state of 
mind are oftentimes not aware of the true reality (Tucket, 2009). It is very likely that 
investors during the crash of UAL stock lived through exactly this process. The 
previously positive feelings that they had towards the stock are replaced by pure hate 
after it crashes. Investors have maintained this state of mind even after the news was 
declared as false and the stock price partially recovered, because of unconscious 
mental work which psychoanalysts call “splitting”: In this sense, reality (that UAL is 
not bankrupt after all) is split from phantasy and feelings such as anxiety, and 
unexplained jitters or dread (towards UAL stock) can be felt for longer periods of time. 
Only after a certain time, when available information can no longer be “split off”, it 
becomes integrated. Even though the effects of this phenomenon are not quantifiable, 
the slow, delayed revision of UAL stock price to fundamental value becomes 
comprehensible by the implications that emotional relationships have on the actions 
of diverse investors. We now focus on more quantifiable measures, capable of giving 
more detailed explanations for the UAL undervaluation. 
 
5.3.6	  Limited	  public	  attention	  
 
The previous sequences have already outlined the importance and 
significance of the media in transmitting information to the markets and in affecting 
how market participants perceive the world. It is oftentimes argued that the failure of 
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UAL’s stock to return to normal levels, as well as other situations of strong 
mispricings throughout history to be caused by limited information due to poor media 
coverage of the issue. Yet, attributing the failure of UAL stock to return to pre-news 
event levels to insufficient information provided to investors by the media is certainly 
wrong.  
In order to prove this, we have analysed the media coverage about United 
Airlines during the episode. In order to estimate whether the news agencies were 
covering the story sufficiently, we have analysed the extent of media coverage during 
the episode. We have manually counted the number of articles released in the 
Bloomberg Terminal about United Airlines in the period surrounding the mispricing 
episode (35 Days before and after false news release). Doing, so we set the 
Bloomberg News filters to Company news: United Airlines, Bloomberg & Editorially 
suggested, Relevence: High, Language: English. 
 
Figure 5: Number of weekly Bloomberg News releases regarding United Airlines 
 
Source: Bloomberg. Manual count 
 
The graph above clearly illustrates the excessive media coverage during the 
episode. While the average daily media coverage in this 10-week interval before and 
after the under-pricing was only 2,61 news releases per day, it shows to be 8,14 daily 
news releases in the period of the under-pricing. We see a total of 57 news releases 
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lower numbers in the weeks surrounding this under-pricing. This statistically 
significant difference stating that the media covered the news episode excessively, 
confirms that investors were in fact significantly informed. 
Whereas limited public attention as well as decreased liquidity and a changing 
investment environment in September 2008 were proven not to be accountable for 
the lasting undervaluation of the UAL stock, the theories of miscalibrated confidence, 
ambiguity aversion and emotional relationships certainly provided explanations for 
this lasting phenomenon. Yet, these explanations are not well quantifiable and do not 
completely satisfy our search for the cause of the undervaluation. As previously 
stated, the intuitively most appealing explanation is excessively negative investor 
sentiment and will therefore be analysed in more depth. 
 
5.4	  Negative	  Investor	  Sentiment	  
 
Throughout this paper the concept of affectivity as well as the implications that 
excessively negative investors can have on the prices of securities, were explained. 
We will now go on by analysing to which extent excessively negative media coverage 
leading to negative investor sentiment has actually been present in this episode. 
While most of financial research takes reception and transmission of news as given, 
this paper aims to estimate the impact of news on asset prices by analysing the 
linguistic of newspaper articles. We will use textual analysis in an attempt to convert 
qualitative information from news stories into a quantifiable measure by analysing the 
positive or negative tone of the information.  
Sentiment analysis can be defined as “the process of determining whether a 
piece of writing is positive, negative or neutral. It is also known as opinion mining, 
deriving the opinion or attitude of a speaker” (Lexalytics.com, 2016). Doing so, we 
build up on previous research, such as by Tetlock (2007), who created a media-
based measure of sentiment by linguistically analysing the Wall Street Journal 
column “Abreast of the Market”. Tetlock uses the General Inquirer, a textual analysis 
program, alongside the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary to calculate the fraction of negative 
words. In this sense, he finds that high levels of negative sentiment predict low 
returns for the Dow-Jones index over a few days, followed by a reversion. 
Additionally he finds, that high trading volumes follow unusually high or low levels of 
pessimism. Regarding timing, Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Mackassy (2008) find 
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that stock prices respond with a one-day delay to negative language in firm-related 
news. Similar research, such as done by Sinha (2009) who uses a sentiment score 
from Thomson-Reuter to measure the tone of news articles and constructs portfolios 
based on past sentiment, shows that a portfolio long in positive and short in negative-
sentiment firms is able to generate abnormal positive returns. 
In order to explain the impact that newspaper articles had on the affect of 
investors, we analyse the sentiment in newspaper articles regarding both United 
Airlines and the airline industry in general in the respected time period.  
 
Data collection 
After careful consideration, it was decided to choose the Bloomberg LT as the 
most appropriate source. The Bloomberg Terminal is an integral piece of software to 
access financial information. The software currently holds over 325,000 subscriptions 
worldwide, and can be seen as the leading news provider for traders, portfolio 
managers, and risk management analysts as well as other financial professionals. In 
order to get a statistically meaningful probe, we have analysed the sentiment of 74 
bloomberg articles on United Airlines. Because Bloomberg news only supplies 50 
articles on a certain filtering, we chose to analyse the 15 top ranked articles on 
September 8th and 9th as well as the 50 top ranked articles on United Airlines from 
the period September 10th to September 14th of 2008. Because some of these 
articles were links to other sources, which did not have these historic articles in the 
database anymore, we ended up with a total of 74 articles to analyse. In order to get 
the most relevant, and yet a sufficient number of articles we set the filters to Source: 
Bloomberg&Editorally Suggested; Relevance: Medium; Language: English. These 
articles were then ranked to Top Rated. In order to get a statistically significant 
approximation of news sentiment regarding the airline industry, we pursued the same 
course of action: Again we analysed the 15 top rated articles from the period of 8th 
and 9th of September 2008, and then the 50 top rated articles from the period of 
September 10th to 14th of 2008. Here the filters were set as follows: Region: United 
States; Industry: Airlines, Air Transport Services ;Language: English; Source: 
Bloomberg & Editorally Suggested; Relevance: Medium. As this research provided 
us with 76 articles, we excluded the 2 lowest rated articles in order to get an equal 
number of inputs. These articles were than formatted in order to fit the Semantria 
Sentiment analysis program. These formattings included only selecting the text 
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(excluding all tables, pictures and videos from the source) and in few situations 
shortening the input text in order to satisfy the Semantria Program requirements.  
 
Software 
In order to analyse the previously collected articles, we decided to use the 
Semantria Lexalytics ® sentiment analysis program. The Lexalytics explanation of 
how the software does sentiment analysis are extracted from the companies 
Whitepaper of 2015 and displayed in the following paragraph:  
“Sentiment scoring allows a computer to consistently rate the positive or 
negative assertions that are associated with a document or entity”...  “Once you have 
reliable, consistent machine-based sentiment scoring, there are a number of 
applications that become feasible inside of financial services (automated trading, 
better information to traders), reputation management (the problem every marketing 
person faces), “voice of customer” (listen to how they’re saying what they say, don’t 
constrain them to closed-ended questions), eDiscovery (was there a wave of 
negative emails before a certain crisis hit?), etc...”...“ Our software identifies the 
emotive phrases within a document and then scores these phrases (roughly - 1 to 
+1) and then combines them to discern the overall sentiment of the sentence” 
 
Findings 
The detailed output of the sentiment Analysis of each article can be found in 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. As the software assigns a sentiment score from -1 to +1 
to a certain article, the subsequent graph shows a graphical representation of the 
distribution of the sentiment scores of all articles regarding United Airlines. 
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Comparing this with the subsequent sentiment distribution of all articles 
relating the Airline Industry, we can already see that the sentiment regarding United 
Airlines in the analysed time period was significantly lower: 
 
Figure 7: News sentiment score distribution regarding Airline Industry 
 
 
Because the analysed time frame is too short to do a regression estimating the 
impact that the news sentiment had on the price evolvement of the UAL stock and 
the airline industry, we can only compare the level of negative sentiment of articles 
regarding United Airlines with articles regarding the airline Industry. In order to do so, 
we construct a Student`s t-test, which is a statistical hypothesis test in which the test 
statistic follows a Student`s t-distribution under the null hypothesis. By setting the null 
hypothesis to “difference between averages equals zero”, we can determine weather 
our two data sets have a statistically different average sentiment. The subsequent 
graph delivers the results of our test: 
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As we can see, this empirical analysis confirms what we have already 
suspected: The average sentiment towards United Airlines was very negative with a 
score of -0.12, while the average sentiment towards the Airline Industry was neutral, 
with a score of 0.07. In addition, the results are statistically significant in the sense 
that we can neglect our null Hypothesis, that the average sentiment of both data 
series is the same, at a 1% level, as seen by the P(T<=t) bi-critical value of 0.00105. 
 
Interpretation 
These findings are coherent with our previous research on negative affectivity. 
Our research proves that throughout the whole mispricing episode, the media 
coverage regarding United Airlines was excessively negative. Even though it is 
impossible to prove the impact that negative media coverage has on the sentiment of 
investors, we interpret these findings in the manner that because of the excessively 
negative news coverage towards United Airlines, negative emotions were generated 
towards United Airlines. These negative emotions are associated with impaired 
cognitive capacity for information processing (Watson and Tellegen, 1985). It is 
therefore probable that investors experienced subjective distress resulting in feelings 
such as sadness, guilt or nervousness, distorting their capability of rational decision-
making. These mechanisms ultimately lead to the irrational, excessively negative 
perception of true value, resulting in a severe undervaluation of the United Airlines 
stock. In line with van Knippenberg’s (2008) research, it seems that investors have 
taken on a preference driven (rather than evidence-driven) processing style, 
diminishing the rational processing capacity of the brain. Our findings also confirm 
Williams, Zainubas and Jacksons research (2003), stating that negative affect leads 
to stronger risk avoidance: Even though a rational investor sees that the 
undervaluation offers a remarkable arbitrage opportunity with the expected gains 
exceeding the implied risks by far, our research shows that investors were not willing 
to take these risks. Our research towards negative investor sentiment has now given 
us a quantifiable empirical explanation for the strong undervaluation of UAL stock.  
6. Conclusion  
	  
This previous research analysed the extent of irrational human behaviour in 
the financial world, and the implications that these behaviours have on prices in 
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financial markets as a whole. In order to find an explanation for the puzzling 
undervaluation of the United Airline Stock in September of 2008, we have conducted 
an extensive literature research in an attempt to find explanations for this puzzle, and 
to discover mechanisms leading to these market anomalies.  
Doing so we have built up on previous research on economic theory, cognition, 
group decision making, and media power. We have served ourselves from previous 
research on these fields, analysed models about group decision-making such as 
from Janis (1972) and applied this research to financial markets. Throughout this 
process, the limitations of humans in their rationality and in their decision-making as 
described by Hirst and Hopkins (1998) quickly became focus of attention as it turned 
out to explain certain behavioural paradigms, also in the financial world. Yet, we have 
seen no signs within our study of the media coverage towards UAL in September 
2008, which leads us to believe that the mispricing was attributed to limited attention.  
Here we have seen the immense impact that the surrounding has on how 
individuals perceive reality. Whereas traditional behavioural literature describe the 
unquestioned general believes in a rather descriptive fashion, we empirically 
analysed the effects of an unquestioned generalized belief, and how the media 
contributes to the establishment of this, on the financial markets.  
Doing so, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the United Airlines 
undervaluation puzzle from September 2008. Here we were able to attain interesting 
results, contributing to already existing behavioural and financial research to this 
topic:  By analysing the stock price evolvement of United Airlines competitor and 
supplier firms, we realized that the United Airlines stock valuation did not have any 
contagion effects on these, leading us to the conclusion that the under-pricing must 
be attributed to a changing perception of value only towards United Airlines, not of 
the Industry. In order to prove this, we have first eliminated decreased liquidity, 
ambiguity aversion and the effects of a changing investment environment prior to the 
financial crisis of 2008 as possible causes by analysing for trading volumes, spreads, 
market returns and the “investor fear gague”. As expected, these market-oriented  
explanations have failed to explain the mispricing of UAL stock. 
In the second part of our case study, we built our research up on previous 
general behavioural finance literature, and empirically examined the effects that 
emotional relationships, limited public attention and especially negative investor 
sentiment have on financial markets in the specific case of the UAL stock 
	   38	  
undervaluation. Doing so, we have outlined the impact that emotions can have on 
stock price evolvement. As our previous research showed the significance and 
influence the media has in public opinion forming, we analysed the effects of the 
media in influencing the public opinion. By the help of quantitative analysis we have 
proven that the media sufficiently covered the mentioned episode, excluding limited 
public attention as a possible explanation to the under-valuation. 
Our main contribution to existing research in behavioural finance literature lies 
in the sentiment analysis of media coverage throughout the mispricing episode. To 
our knowledge there has not been any study of news sentiment regarding the UAL 
undervaluation in September 2008. Here we have built up on research by Tetlock 
(2007) and were able to empirically display the impact that excessively negative 
media coverage has not only in influencing perceptions and expectations of investors, 
but also which outcomes this can have on prices in financial markets. Besides the 
interesting findings for academic research, this thesis gives implications useful for 
professional fund managers and other investors, who can benefit from these findings 
by adjusting their trading strategy to account for the effects of negative news 
coverage on investor sentiment. 
Despite these extremely interesting findings, there is further research to be 
done in the area of behavioural finance, especially in regard to analysing the effects 
that (negative) investor sentiment has on stock prices. We have assumed that 
excessively negative media coverage leads directly to negative investor sentiment. 
This needs to be examined in more detail by means of qualitative research, of how 
strongly financial media actually influences the perceptions of agents. Here 
immediate qualitative interviews of key market participants in periods of mispricing 
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Appendix 1: UA and UA Supplier Prices on September 8th 2008 (a) 
around trading halt and (b) throughout the day 
 
 
Source: Marshall et al. (2010) 
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Appendix 2: Extract of Input for Sentiment Analysis (United Airlines
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